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T HE DETERMINATION of whether a tort action is withinthe federal court's admiralty jurisdiction traditionally de-
pended on the location of the wrong. If the wrong occurred on
or over navigable waters, the action was within the federal
court's admiralty jurisdiction; if the wrong occurred on land,
the action was not within this jurisdiction. Navigable waters
were considered waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.
Later, the definition of navigable waters was expanded to in-
clude lakes and rivers.' The historic view of the Supreme Court
was that the admiralty tort jurisdiction of the federal courts
would be determined by the locality of the accident and that
maritime law governs only those torts occurring on the naviga-
ble waters of the United States. 2
The Supreme Court's 1972 landmark decision in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland changed the traditional locality-
based rule and added the requirement that the tort must "bear a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."3 Since
1972, courts have struggled to define which aviation torts prop-
erly fall within the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction.
Cases involving aviation accidents are often brought into fed-
eral court based on admiralty jurisdiction. In many cases there
is an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of
citizenship or the Warsaw Convention. However, claimants
often seek to invoke admiralty jurisdiction in order to have sub-
stantive maritime law apply to their wrongful death and survival
claims arising out of a fatal accident. A claimant's desire to have
general maritime law apply is rooted in the possibility of a large
and unpredictable recovery for the decedent's pre-impact pain
and suffering as well as punitive damages - elements of damage
that may be unavailable under state wrongful death and survival
statutes.
However, the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction over an avi-
ation accident is usually only the first hurdle plaintiffs must
cross before substantive maritime law will apply. A federal
choice-of-law analysis may compel the application of state law
instead of maritime law to a particular issue in a case that is
within the court's admiralty jurisdiction.
Also, the Executive Jet test for jurisdiction does not apply to all
aviation accidents occurring on navigable waters. For example,
1 53 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1851).
2 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971).
3 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
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aviation accidents that fall under the Death on the High Seas
Act ("DOHSA") have an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion because the statute presents a federal question. "[I]t may
be considered as settled today that [DOHSA] gives the federal
admiralty courts jurisdiction over such wrongful death actions. '4
Commercial aviation accidents that occur on the high seas be-
yond twelve nautical miles of the United States shoreline are
governed by DOHSA.5 Significantly, pre-impact pain and suffer-
ing and punitive damages are unavailable under DOHSA.6
The following discussion applies to aviation accidents that do
not fall under DOHSA, such as cases involving commercial avia-
tion accidents in the ocean but within state territorial waters, or
cases involving a crash into a lake or river. The aim of the dis-
cussion is to provide an analytical framework for determining
whether admiralty jurisdiction is properly invoked in aviation
tort cases. Four categories of aviation accidents will be evalu-
ated. The article concludes that admiralty jurisdiction is prop-
erly invoked in three of the four scenarios (the "fortuitous
accident" being the exception). However, even if the federal
court's jurisdiction lies in admiralty, a federal choice of law anal-
ysis leads to the conclusion that the recoverable elements of
damage for the death of a non-seaman should be determined in
accordance with the law of the decedent's domicile state.
Consider a hypothetical fact pattern of a California Airways
flight from Vancouver, British Columbia, to San Diego, Califor-
nia. This flight would originate near the Pacific coast, pass over
the Strait of Georgia and Washington State, and arrive in South-
ern California. The entire flight would be over land near the
Pacific Ocean or over navigable waters for a short time. Because
the scheduled flight plan is either over land or within a few
miles of the shore, the flight would be authorized to dispatch
without water survival equipment such as life rafts.
In this hypothetical, the aircraft is a brand new, two-engine
Ryan 848. One of the engines is over-temping. This is not a life-
threatening situation, but the crew must troubleshoot and deter-
mine whether to shut the engine down and land. The crew re-
quests a deviation from their flight plan to evaluate the engine
problem over the Pacific, away from other aviation traffic.
4 Id. at 263.
5 46 U.S.C. app. § 761(b) (2000).
6 See Dooley v. Korean Airlines, 524 U.S. 116, 118 (1998); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
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While over the Pacific, the 848 experiences catastrophic engine
failure which throws several blades through the wing, causing a
loss of control. The aircraft plunges into the ocean three miles
off Pacific Beach.
Should federal courts exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the
wrongful death and survival claims brought by the passengers'
representatives? Under Executive Jet, the answer is no.
I. STANDARD FOR APPLICATION OF MARITIME
JURISDICTION TO AVIATION TORTS
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland is the leading Su-
preme Court case on admiralty jurisdiction over aviation acci-
dents.7 The Court in Executive Jet expressed a narrow view of
which aviation accidents fall within the federal courts' admiralty
jurisdiction. Executive Jet involved a charter flight from Cleve-
land, Ohio to White Plains, New York that crashed into Lake
Erie shortly after take off.
Under Executive Jet, maritime law applies when the wrong "oc-
curs or is located on or over navigable waters," and the wrong
"bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity."8 This test is sometimes referred to as the "locality-plus test."
Executive Jet resolved a split among the circuit courts and super-
seded prior Supreme Court cases using a strict locality-based
standard. For example, the Supreme Court previously had held
that admiralty jurisdiction did not apply where a longshoreman
standing on a pier was struck by a ship's sling, knocked into the
water, and fatally injured because "[t] he substance and consum-
mation of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action
took place on land."9 Yet the same court held admiralty jurisdic-
tion did apply where a longshoreman working on a vessel was
struck by a hoist and knocked onto a pier because the claim
arose on the vessel.1" This lack of a coherent principle to guide
application of admiralty jurisdiction led to the "locality-plus" test
announced in Executive Jet. In support of its decision to impose
the additional "significant relationship" requirement, the Su-
preme Court in Executive Jet noted "[i] t is far more consistent
with the history and purpose of admiralty to require also that
7 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
8 Id. at 268.
9 Id. at 255 (quoting Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 182 (1928)).
10 Id. (citing Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935)).
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the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity."1
A relevant question in applying the "significant relationship"
prong of the Executive Jet standard is "whether a tortfeasor's activ-
ity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable waters is so
closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law
that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would ap-
ply. 1 2 Traditional maritime law issues include a ship's seawor-
thiness, maintenance and cure issues, issues pertaining to
maritime liens, the general average, captures and prizes, limita-
tion of liability, damage to cargo, and salvage claims. 13
As to application of maritime law to aviation tort cases, the
Supreme Court stated that aviation tort cases are not tradition-
ally subject to admiralty jurisdiction because the "[r] ules and
concepts... [of maritime law] are wholly alien to air commerce,
whose vehicles operate in a totally different element, un-
hindered by geographical boundaries and exempt from the
navigational rules of the maritime road. ' 14 Thus, "[lt] he matters
with which admiralty is basically concerned have no conceivable
bearing on the operation of aircraft, whether over land or over
water."15 The Court also made it clear that maritime law does
not apply to aviation tort cases in the absence of a transoceanic
flight. 16
II. THE "POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE IMPACT ON
MARITIME COMMERCE" TEST SHOULD NOT
APPLY TO AVIATION ACCIDENTS
Litigants often cite to subsequent Supreme Court cases that
purportedly expand the Executive Jet standard to include consid-
eration of whether the alleged wrong has a potentially disruptive
impact on maritime commerce in order to satisfy the significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity requirement.17
11 Id. at 268.
12 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,
539 (1995).
13 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 274 n.26.
17 See Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. 527, 538 (1995);
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457
U.S. 668, 675 (1982). Foremost, Grubart, and Sisson expanded the Executive Jet test
to non-aviation torts. Sisson involved a fire that caused damage to a marina and
moored pleasure yachts. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360. Foremost involved a pleasure boat
2004]
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However, none of these subsequent Supreme Court cases ad-
dresses admiralty jurisdiction over aviation torts. Nor do the
cases attempt to modify the holding in Executive Jet. Indeed,
there are only two examples of a court applying this factor to an
aviation accident: Brown v. Eurocopter, S.A.,' 8 and Williamson v.
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,19 neither of which was appealed. Both
decisions involved transportation to oil rigs in the Gulf of Mex-
ico.2" The flights had a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity because the helicopters were performing a
function traditionally carried out by crew boats.21 As demon-
strated below, the cases really do not reflect any change from
Executive Jet because the district courts have uniformly found
that helicopter transport in oil rig operations satisfies the Execu-
tive Jet test regardless of whether the activity poses a potential
hazard to maritime commerce.
Application of the "potential disruptive impact" test would re-
turn us to the pre-Executive Jet locality-based standard because
every commercial aviation accident on navigable waters would
likely have a potential and actual disruptive impact on maritime
commerce. When an aircraft goes down over navigable waters,
there inevitably will be an extensive search and rescue effort.
Wreckage must be recovered, and the cause of the accident
thoroughly investigated. All of these activities require maritime
resources. Because a particular aviation accident over navigable
waters can never be anticipated, the necessity for maritime re-
sources in a time of crisis will always have a potentially disruptive
impact on maritime commerce. If this factor is applied, all that
would be required for maritime jurisdiction would be the pre-
Executive Jet locality test. Application of the "potential disruptive
impact" factor is thus inappropriate. The Supreme Court has
never applied this factor to an aviation case, and for a lower
court to do so would be contrary to Executive Jet.
collision on a Louisiana river. Foremost, 457 U.S. at 669. Grubart involved a Chi-
cago flood that was caused by barge owners' operations near a freight tunnel
under the riverbed. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 530. In so doing, the Supreme Court
also considered whether the activity giving rise to the cause of action was suffi-
cient to pose a hazard to maritime commerce. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 552; Sisson,
497 U.S. at 362; Foremost, 457 U.S. at 675 n.5.
18 38 F. Supp. 2d 515, 518 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
19 32 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
20 Brown, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 516; Williamson, 32 F. Supp. at 457.
21 Brown, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 518; Williamson, 32 F. Supp. at 459.
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III. "FORTUITOUS" AVIATION ACCIDENTS IN
NAVIGABLE WATERS DO NOT SUPPORT APPLICATION
OF MARITIME LAW UNDER THE EXECUTIVE
JET STANDARD
Aviation accidents would not seem to implicate traditional ad-
miralty issues such as seaworthiness, maintenance and cure,
maritime liens, general average, captures and prizes, limitation
of liability, damage to cargo, and salvage claims. In addition,
the wrongs alleged by plaintiffs in such cases often do not occur
on navigable waters even where the crash itself does. The inade-
quate maintenance or operation of the aircraft that may have
led to a crash often occurs on land. In other cases, the reason
the flight crashed into the navigable waters is that the pilots
were attempting to troubleshoot problems with their aircraft
over water where no one on the ground could be harmed,
rather than over a heavily populated area.
Moreover, commercial carriers operate under Title 14 Code
of Federal Regulations Part 121 on regularly scheduled flights
from points that are accessible by land and sea.22 All aspects of
accident flights are governed by an extensive and pervasive fed-
eral regulatory scheme promulgated to address the unique and
modern character of commercial air transportation. 23 The
"rules of the road" are governed by federal regulation, not tradi-
tional admiralty concepts.
In most cases, as in Executive Jet, the only connection between
an accident and traditional maritime concepts is its occurrence
on navigable waters. The Supreme Court, however, has held
this alone is inadequate to support application of maritime law.
"Neither the fact that a plane goes down on navigable waters
nor the fact that the negligence 'occurs' while a plane is flying
over such waters is enough to create a relationship to traditional
maritime activity as to justify the invocation of admiralty
jurisdiction. "24
In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court hypothesized that: "[a]n
aircraft . . . [flying from New York to London and crashing in
the mid-Atlantic] might be thought to bear a significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activity because it would be per-
forming a function traditionally performed by waterborne
22 14 C.F.R. § 121 (2004).
23 See id.
24 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270-71.
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vessels. '2' The Ninth Circuit applies the "locality-plus" Executive
jet analysis discussed above, and also considers the element of
whether the aircraft was performing a function that, absent the
advent of air travel, could only be performed by a waterborne
vessel.26 Accordingly, an aviation tort is generally not subject to
federal maritime jurisdiction where the accident's occurrence
over navigable waters is merely "fortuitous."
IV. A SURVEY OF CASES APPLYING THE EXECUTIVE JET
STANDARD TO AVIATION TORTS
The cases regarding what constitutes a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity since Executive Jet break down
into four distinct categories.
The first category involves aviation accidents where a helicop-
ter is transporting passengers to and from oil rigs in territorial
waters. In these cases, the courts find a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity because the helicopter is per-
forming a service normally conducted by crewboat vessels.
The second category is aviation accidents involving sea-planes.
In these cases, the courts find a significant relationship to mari-
time activity because the problems of taking off and landing at
sea differ from those encountered with conventional aircraft.
The third category involves transoceanic or island voyages
where, but for the advent of air transportation, the only way to
reach these destinations would be by sea. This category is analo-
gous to the Executive Jet dictum of a transoceanic flight from New
York to London. The courts find a significant relationship to
maritime activity in these cases because transoceanic air travel
fulfills a function which was traditionally performed by water-
borne vessels.
The fourth category involves "fortuitous" aviation accidents in
navigable waters. This category involves fact patterns where
25 Id. at 271.
26 See, e.g., Williams v. FAA, 711 F.2d 893, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
maritime law applies to an aircraft crash en route between Hawaii and California
because the only alternative means of reaching Hawaii is by ship); Roberts v.
United States, 498 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The transoceanic transporta-
tion of cargo is an activity which is readily analogized with 'traditional maritime
activity.' Indeed before the advent of aviation such shipping could only be per-
formed by waterborne vessels."); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477
U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (stating in dicta that admiralty jurisdiction may apply to a
helicopter crash ferrying passengers to an offshore oil rig because traditionally
the only way to get passengers to an oil rig is by boat; therefore, the helicopter
would be fulfilling a traditional maritime role).
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water and air travel are not the exclusive means of access. In
these cases, the courts find that a significant relationship to mar-
itime activity does not exist.
The four categories provide a framework for analyzing mari-
time jurisdiction problems.
A. CATEGORY 1: ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HELICOPTER TRANSPORT
TO OIL RIGS SUPPORT MARITIME JURISDICTION
The following cases involve aviation accidents where a heli-
copter is transporting passengers to and from oil rigs in territo-
rial waters. In these cases, the courts find a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity because the helicop-
ter is performing a service normally conducted by crewboat
vessels.
In Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., a helicopter crashed at
sea.27 The court found that admiralty jurisdiction existed be-
cause the helicopter was being used in place of a vessel to ferry
personnel and supplies to and from offshore drilling
structures.28
In Fosen v. United Tech. Corp., a helicopter crashed in the
North Sea off the coast of Norway. 29 The accident occurred
when the helicopter was transporting Phillips Petroleum em-
ployees to an oil rig.3 0 The helicopter crashed about thirty miles
from the coastline, a and the court found that extensive offshore
operations fall within the court's admiralty jurisdiction. 2
In Pan Air Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., the court exercised admiralty
jurisdiction over claims (or a claim) for property damage arising
out a helicopter crash on the outer Continental Shelf.33 The
court reasoned that the crash of a helicopter while it is being
used in place of a vessel to ferry personnel and supplies to and
from an offshore drilling structure bears the type of significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity necessary to invoke
admiralty jurisdiction.34
27 609 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1980).
28 Id.
29 484 F. Supp. 490, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 496.
33 684 F.2d 1102, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1982).
34 Id.
20041
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In Garrett v. Air Logistics, Inc., a helicopter crashed in the Gulf
of Mexico. 5 Admiralty jurisdiction existed because helicopters
being used in place of a vessel to transport personnel and mate-
rial to and from an offshore drilling structure bears a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity. 6
In Brown v. Eurocopter, a helicopter crashed in the Gulf of Mex-
ico. 3 7 Admiralty jurisdiction applied because the use of helicop-
ters to transport personnel to and from offshore drilling
platforms is close enough in spirit to the use of boats to perform
such tasks to show the necessary relationship to traditional mari-
time activity. 8
In Williamson v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., a helicopter crashed
in the Gulf of Mexico.3 9 Admiralty jurisdiction existed because
the use of helicopters to transport personnel to and from off-
shore platforms is close enough in spirit to the use of boats to
perform such tasks to show the necessary relationship.4"
B. CATEGORY 2: ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SEA-PLANES SUPPORT
MARITIME JURISDICTION
The second category of cases consists of aviation accidents in-
volving seaplanes. In such cases the courts find a significant re-
lationship to maritime activity because the problems of taking
off and landing at sea are distinctly maritime and differ from
those encountered with conventional aircraft and therefore
there is a relationship to traditional maritime activity.
In Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., a Grumman Goose crashed
shortly after water takeoff in harbor waters.4 The highest alti-
tude the Goose reached was 200 feet.4 2 The scheduled flight
was from St. Thomas to St. Croix.4 3 Admiralty jurisdiction ex-
isted in this case because the problems of take-off and landing
of a seaplane differ from those encountered with conventional
aircraft and are influenced by the "marine" nature of the runway
used.44
35 Civ. A. No. 95-2190, 1996 WL 492300, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1996).
36 Id. at *2.
37 38 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
38 Id. at 518.
39 32 F. Supp. 2d 456, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
40 Id. at 459.
41 355 F. Supp. 683, 684 (D.C.V.I. 1973).
42 Id. at 685.
43 Id. at 684.
44 Id. at 686.
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In Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., a Grumman Goose
crashed a few miles northeast of the Puerto Rican Island of Cu-
lebra.45 The flight departed from St. Thomas and was heading
to Fajardo, Puerto Rico.46 Admiralty jurisdiction existed be-
cause the pilot attempted to make a sea landing after both en-
gines malfunctioned.4 7 Under the circumstances, the court
found little difference between a hydroplane capable of naviga-
tion on water that crashed and a ship."
In Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Tech. Corp., a helicopter took
off from an Icelandic Coast Guard ("ICG") vessel on a routine
training mission and patrol.4 9 The helicopter had been in flight
for approximately one minute when it crashed into the ocean. 0
Admiralty jurisdiction existed because the helicopter was manu-
factured for the ICG to be used in marine rescue and other mar-
itime operations, and the helicopter was specially equipped with
an emergency flotation system for ocean landings.51
In Flying Boat, Inc. v. Alberto, a seaplane crashed during takeoff
when the nose pitched up and then crashed back down in the
navigable waters of Key West Harbor in an area of commercial
fishing traffic.52 Admiralty jurisdiction existed because the
wrong associated with improper installation, maintenance and
use of a marine bilge pump on a commercial seaplane arises
from an activity having a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity.53
C. CATEGORY 3: TRANSOcEANIc OR ISLAND VOYAGES
(THE "BUT FOR" TEST)
These cases involve transoceanic or island voyages where, but
for the advent of air transportation, the only way to reach these
destinations would be by sea. The third category is analogous to
the Executive Jet dictum of a transoceanic flight from New York to
London.
In Roberts v. United States, a Flying Tiger Lines cargo plane
crashed in navigable waters 1500 to 1900 feet short of the run-
45 440 F. Supp. 828, 832 (D.C.V.I. 1977).
46 Id. at 831.
47 Id. at 840.
48 Id. at 841.
49 722 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. Conn. 1989).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 946.
52 723 So. 2d 866, 867 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1998).
53 Id. at 868.
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way at Naha Air Base in Okinawa, Japan.54 The flight was carry-
ing cargo from Los Angeles. 55 Admiralty jurisdiction applied
because geographic realities make the transoceanic transporta-
tion of cargo an activity which is readily analogized to traditional
maritime activity.56 The crash in navigable waters thus was not
merely "fortuitous. ,57
In American Home Assurance Co. v. United States, an airplane
crashed en route from Atlantic City, New Jersey to Block Island,
New York.58 The airplane disappeared in the Atlantic Ocean. 59
The district court held that Admiralty jurisdiction did not exist
because Executive Jet reserved judgment on the question of
whether an aviation tort can ever, under any circumstances,
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity,
and the court doubted whether airplane accidents are proper
subjects of admiralty suits.6 ° This case is quite an anomaly be-
cause prior to the advent of travel by air, the only way to reach
Block Island would have been by sea.61 However, the court held
that the fact that Block Island was separated from the mainland
was not sufficient alone to distinguish the case from Executive
./et.62
In Hammill v. Olympic Airways, an Olympic Airways commercial
flight from Korfu Island to Athens, Greece crashed in Voula Bay
within one mile of land on approach to Athens airport.63 Admi-
ralty jurisdiction existed because the airplane was on a flight
across the Mediterranean Sea and was serving a function that
had traditionally been carried on by surface going maritime
vessels. 64
In Williams v. U.S., a DC-3 was lost and presumed crashed
while on a flight from California to Hawaii.65 Admiralty jurisdic-
tion existed because transoceanic flight fulfills a function that
was traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. 66 The DC-3's
54 498 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1974).
55 Id. at 524.
56 Id.
57 Id.





63 398 F. Supp. 829, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
64 Id. at 834.
65 711 F.2d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1984).
66 Id. at 896.
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contact with the waters of the Pacific Ocean was not merely
fortuitous. 67
In Miller v. United States, a plane crashed in international wa-
ters forty miles southeast of West Palm Beach. 68 The flight had
departed Freeport, Bahamas and was bound for Palm Beach,
Florida International Airport.69 Admiralty jurisdiction existed
because the aircraft was performing a function traditionally per-
formed by waterborne vessels.7
In re Air Disaster near Honolulu, Hawaii involved a mid-air acci-
dent of United Airlines Flight 881 .7 1 The flight left Honolulu
International for Auckland, New Zealand.72 Eighty-five (85)
miles south of Honolulu, the forward cargo door separated
from the aircraft.73 Nine passengers were sucked out of the air-
plane and lost at sea.7 ' Admiralty jurisdiction existed because
transoceanic transportation of passengers by air is a function tra-
ditionally performed by waterborne vessels.75
In Preston v. Frantz, a helicopter crashed en route from Con-
necticut to Nantucket Island.76 Admiralty jurisdiction existed
because travel from the mainland to Nantucket Island would, of
necessity, have to be accomplished by ship but for the introduc-
tion of air travel.77
D. CATEGORY 4: "FoRTUITOus" AVIATION ACCIDENTS IN
TERRITORIAL WATERS
These cases involve fact patterns where water and air travel
are not the exclusive means of access. In a majority of these
cases the courts find that a significant relationship to maritime
activity does not exist.
In Teachey v. United States, the United States Coast Guard con-
ducted a helicopter rescue operation of a sinking shrimp boat in
the Gulf of Mexico.7 8 After recovery, the helicopter landed
67 Id.
6s 725 F.2d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1315.
71 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1543.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1543-44; see also Morgan v. United Air Lines, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1046,
1053 (D. Colo. 1990).
76 11 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 1993).
77 Id. at 359.
78 363 F. Supp. 1197, 1198 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
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briefly at Key West, Florida and then departed for
St. Petersburg, Florida.79 The helicopter crashed just off the
coast of St. Petersburg.0 Admiralty jurisdiction did not exist be-
cause the helicopter did not crash in the performance of an air-
sea rescue, but instead while it was traveling from one Coast
Guard base to another."s The flight was merely land-based air-
craft between points within the continental United States. 82
In Overseas National Airways, Inc. v. United States, an Overseas
National Airways jet struck a flock of sea gulls during takeoff.8 3
The jet was brought to a stop on the runway, but the plane was
destroyed by fire.84 The court applied Executive Jet to hold that
state law and not federal law governs aviation tort litigation. 5
In City of New York v. Waterfront Airways, a collision occurred
between a Cessna floatplane operating as an air taxi between
New Jersey and Wall Street and a New York City Police Depart-
ment Bell 206A helicopter.8 6 The Cessna crashed into the East
River and the Bell crashed into an unoccupied building in
Brooklyn. 7 Admiralty jurisdiction did not exist because water
and air travel are not the exclusive means of access (between
New Jersey and New York).88
In Brons v. Beech Aircraft Corp., a crash occurred approximately
4.5 nautical miles off the coast of Fort Myers, Florida.89 The
flight was to begin and end in Florida."° Admiralty jurisdiction
did not exist because the flight bore no relationship to tradi-
tional maritime activity.9 ' The trip was related to training and
flight instruction, and the location of the accident was totally
fortuitous.9 2
Our hypothetical crash, on a flight from Vancouver to San Di-
ego, probably falls under the fourth category of cases described
above. It is likely a court would hold there was no admiralty
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1199.
82 Id.
83 766 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1985).
84 Id. at 99.
85 Id. at 100-01.
86 620 F. Supp. 411, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 415.
89 627 F. Supp. 230, 231 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 233.
92 Id.
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jurisdiction because there was no relationship to traditional
maritime activities and the locality of the accident was purely
"fortuitous." Unlike the cases involving transoceanic transporta-
tion described in category three, in the hypothetical case over-
land transportation, including roads and highways, provide an
alternative to air transportation. Thus, the flight from Vancou-
ver to San Diego is properly analogized to the Executive Jet flight
from Cleveland, Ohio to White Plains, New York, as both routes
can be traveled by means other than air or through navigable
waters.
The only reason the flight deviated from its flight plan and
flew over the Pacific was because of the problem the crew be-
lieved they were encountering with the engine. Thus, the loca-
tion of the flight at the time of the accident, over navigable
waters in the Pacific Ocean, was completely fortuitous and unre-
lated to the customary manner of transportation. 93
Further, the above flight was authorized to dispatch without
water survival equipment such as life rafts, and in fact did dis-
patch without such equipment. Federal Aviation Regulations al-
low aircraft to travel without this equipment if the flight planned
is within fifty miles of the coast.94 This is further evidence of the
intent of the airline to operate the aircraft over land, not water.
The accident described above is precisely the type of tort case
the Supreme Court in Executive Jet stated is not subject to mari-
time jurisdiction. The Supreme Court even went out of its way
to provide a hypothetical in a footnote to ensure its point would
be understood. It provided the example of a flight from New
York City to Miami, Florida, which would "no doubt involve pas-
sage over 'the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore
of any State.' 5 The court stated a case involving tort claims
arising from that flight still would not be subject to federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction unless the terms of DOHSA applied.96 Our hy-
pothetical flight is conceptually identical to the New York to
Florida example given by the Supreme Court. Furthermore,
DOHSA will not apply to this accident because it occurred three
93 See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 273 ("In the situation before us, which is only
fortuitously and incidentally connected to navigable waters and which bears no
relationship to traditional maritime activity, the [state] courts could plainly exer-
cise jurisdiction over the suit, and could plainly apply familiar concepts of [state]
tort law without any effect on maritime endeavors.").
94 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 121.339 (2003).
95 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 274 n.26.
96 Id.
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miles off the coast of California. Accordingly, no traditional
maritime nexus exists for a flight between Vancouver and San
Diego, or for the route assigned to the flight. The accident giv-
ing rise to plaintiffs' claims under the circumstances does not
bear a "significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity. 9
7
V. EVEN IF MARITIME JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY
INVOKED, YAMAHA AND ITS PROGENY REQUIRE
APPLICATION OF STATE LAW TO COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES ISSUES
Admiralty jurisdiction does not entail the automatic applica-
tion of maritime law. Even if admiralty jurisdiction exists under
the Executive Jet test, the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun requires the application of
state law remedies to wrongful deaths of non-seamen occurring
in state or United States territorial waters in a non-DOHSA
case.
98
A. FEDERAL CHOICE OF LAw ANALYSIS MUST CONSIDER THE
DOMICILE OF THE DECEDENT
Under the holding of Yamaha and its progeny, a court must
apply a federal choice-of-law analysis to determine which body
of law has the "most significant relationship to the incident and
the dominant interest in having its law applied" to the plaintiffs'
claims for damages.99 The suggestion that plaintiffs are free to
select state or maritime remedies when the court's jurisdiction
lies in admiralty ignores the competing state and federal inter-
ests in having its law apply to a case involving the deaths of non-
seamen in state territorial waters.
The question presented in Yamaha was: "Does the federal
maritime claim for wrongful death recognized in Morange supply
the exclusive remedy in cases involving the deaths of non-seafar-
ers in territorial waters?"1 ° The Supreme Court answered this
question in the negative by holding "the damages available for
the jet ski death of Natalie Calhoun are properly governed by
state law."'' The Supreme Court in Yamaha did not allow plain-
97 See id. at 268.
98 516 U.S. 1999 (1996).
99 See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2000).
100 Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 205.
101 Id. at 216.
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tiffs to elect a state or maritime wrongful death remedy. Rather,
the Court determined that state law applied exclusively to the
issue of compensatory damages in actions where the district
court's jurisdiction lies in admiralty and the death of a non-sea-
man occurred in territorial waters. 10 2
Following the Supreme Court's Yamaha decision, the case was
remanded for further proceedings to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on the dual questions of choice of law and liability
standards, "reserv[ing] for another day reconciliation of these
issues . . . ."1 In Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., Judge Pollack
addressed the choice of law issues using "depecage. "104 As to the
issue of compensatory damages, the district court applied the
law of Pennsylvania (the law of the decedent's domicile) be-
cause "[i] t is Pennsylvania that must care for the Calhoun family
in their loss and must afford what compensation is appropriate
for the estate of Natalie Calhoun."10 5 Accordingly, there is a
strong presumption that the law of the decedent's domicile will
provide the appropriate remedies for death of a non-seaman in
territorial waters.
An appeal to the Third Circuit followed the district court's
ruling."0 6 The Court of Appeals first addressed the threshold
question of whether federal or state choice-of-law rules provide
the rule of decision with respect to the remedies available in a
wrongful death action under general maritime law.107 The
Third Circuit concluded that because the court's jurisdiction lay
in admiralty, federal choice-of-law rules applied in wrongful
death actions arising from the death of a non-seaman in territo-
rial waters."0 Applying the choice-of-law principles applicable
to admiralty cases, the Third Circuit determined that "through
the lens of the depecage doctrine" the decedent's domicile "has
a substantial interest in obtaining compensation for its citizens
in order to remedy wrongs that have been committed against
102 Id.
103 Id. at 216 n.14.
104 "Depecage refers to the use of the law of different states to resolve different
issues in the same case." Calhoun, 216 F.3d at 342 n.7. The use of "depecage" to
address complex choice-of-law issues is not uncommon in air crash litigation, par-
ticularly with respect to damages issues. SeeJames A.R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in
Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and The Common Law, 54 LA. L. REv.
1001 (1994).
105 Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
106 Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2000).
107 Id. at 343.
108 Id. at 343-345.
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such individuals.""1 9 The Third Circuit thus affirmed the district
court's ruling. The subsequent history of Yamaha thus supports
the conclusion that the law of the decedent's domicile should
apply to determine the proper measure of compensatory dam-
ages in maritime cases involving the death of a non-seaman in
territorial waters.
While the decedent's domicile has a compelling interest in
having its law apply when one of its citizens perishes in a plane
crash, a federal interest in the application of maritime law does
not exist under the circumstances of most accidents. For exam-
ple, the carrier's liability often is governed solely by the Warsaw
Convention. 110 Accordingly, the liability standards applicable to
the carrier are rarely determined in accordance with maritime
law. Any federal maritime interest is thus pre-empted by an in-
ternational treaty."l'
A single state-law remedial framework should apply after the
court conducts a careful choice-of-law analysis under principles
developed by federal courts exercising maritime jurisdiction.
Applying those factors inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
law of the state with the most significant interest in having its
remedies apply should be given full effect. The decedent's dom-
icile has the most significant interest in having its remedies ap-
ply to the issue of compensatory damages. 1 2
10q Id. at 347.
110 See El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1999).
H' The primary focus of maritime law and jurisdiction is the protection of mar-
itime commerce. Therefore, the prevailing federal interest can be fully vindi-
cated if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to uniform rules of
conduct. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 (1982). Even if
maritime law is held to apply in a particular case, substantive maritime rules only
apply to the defendants not covered by the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly, the
a carrier often stands in the unique position that the interest in the protection of
maritime commerce must give way to the Warsaw Convention.
112 Other cases involving aviation mass disasters have recognized that the law of
the decedent's domicile has a unique interest in compensation and distribution
of recovery. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994,
926 F. Supp. 736, 744-745 (N.D. I1.1996); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo., 720 F. Supp. 1505, 1530 (D. Colo. 1989) rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 964 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1979) affd
644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass. July 31,
1973, 415 F. Supp. 206, 210 (D. Mass. 1976). Therefore it is not uncommon that
laws of different states will provide the measure of damages to different plaintiffs
arising from the same accident. Indeed, this is also the case in domestic flights
when some passengers' damages are governed by the Warsaw Convention. See,
e.g., In re Air Crash at Little Rock Arkansas onJune 1, 1999, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1022,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Maritime jurisdiction is properly invoked in aviation cases that
involve (1) helicopter transport in oil rig operations, (2) cases
involving a sea-plane that crashes in navigable waters, and
(3) transoceanic or island voyages. Maritime jurisdiction does
not apply to aviation torts where the crash into navigable waters
is purely fortuitous. Nonetheless, even if maritime jurisdiction is
properly invoked, the federal courts must apply a federal choice
of law analysis to the issue of compensatory damages. In cases
involving the death of a non-seaman, the law of the decedent's
domicile state should apply to the measure of damages for
wrongful death and survival actions.
1024 (E.D. Ark. 2000). Commentators also recognize that "[t] he choice of law of
the plaintiffs domicile is the most sensible solution to conflicts concerning com-
pensatory damages." John B. Austin, A General Framework for Analyzing Choice-of-
Law Problems in Air Crash Litigation, 58J. AIR L. & COMM. 909, 962-63 (1993).
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